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Abstract 
MORE THAN A CENTURY after its first publication, Santi Romano’s Ordiamento Giuridico is finally 
available to an English-speaking audience, as The Legal Order (TLO), thanks to Mariano Croce’s efforts in 
translating the work. 




The English Awakening of Santi 
Romano’s Ordiamento Giuridico:  
a Review of The Legal Order1
ATA KASSAIAN2
MORE THAN A CENTURY after its first publication, Santi Romano’s Ordiamento 
Giuridico is finally available to an English-speaking audience, as The Legal Order 
(TLO), thanks to Mariano Croce’s efforts in translating the work.
Ordiamento Giuridico is a seminal work of legal theory and a cornerstone 
of legal pluralism and legal institutionalism. Romano was a professor of 
Administrative Law at the genesis of a nascent Italian nation state grappling 
with entrenched non-static institutions.3 From 1929 to 1944, Romano was the 
President of the Council of State, Italy’s highest court for matters of administrative 
1. Santi Romano, The Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) [translated by Marco Croce] [TLO]. 
Published as a part of Routledge Law and Politics: Continental Perspectives series, Croce’s 
translation is complemented by a foreword from Martin Loughin and an afterthought by 
the translator. Loughin’s foreword describes the evolving role of the state in the period from 
the late 19th to the early 20th century, when industrialization and socio-political change 
called for a rethinking of the state and state law. He also outlines legal theoretical currents 
of positivist, evolutionary, and institutionalist schools of law as the backdrop to Romano’s 
reflections and work. Croce’s Afterword helps further situate Romano’s visionary definition  
of the law and engages in a critical analysis of TLO.
2. B.C.L./LL.B. McGill University. The author is indebted to Filali Osman for introducing 
him to Romano’s Legal Order, the late Rod Macdonald for showing the applications of legal 
pluralism, Richard Haigh for his generosity in editing and substantially improving the initial 
draft, and editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. This review was undertaken in a strictly 
personal capacity and the author takes responsibility for any shortcomings or misstatements.
3. Romano, supra note 1 at 112.
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law.4 His scholarship and experience offered him insight into resolving labour 
disputes, adjudicating administrative conflicts, and reconciling legal enactments 
with social realities. In TLO, Romano acknowledges international law, the 
Catholic Church, and organized crime as institutions with their own rules 
outside the state’s legal system. The strength of Romano’s theory is that it does 
not ignore or modify facts to fit a definition of the law; for Romano, it is the 
conceptual framework that must be adjusted to accommodate realities, not the 
other way around.5
I. PART I OF TLO: DECONSTRUCTING INCOHERENT 
THEORIES OF THE LAW
Originally published in 1917, Part I of TLO starts with a deconstructionist 
analysis of the legal theories popular at the time.6 Romano introduces definitions 
of the law and demonstrates their limits by exposing their inadequacies when 
applied outside the specific factual confines in which they are typically used. 
Having demonstrated the inconsistencies in these theories, Romano sets out 
to find a coherent general definition of the law. He eventually concludes that: 
(1) law should be traced back to society; (2) law should involve order or rules; 
and (3) law should not be viewed as a social phenomenon, but as “an entity in 
its own right.”7
Romano’s first target is the positivist idea of law as a body of enacted rules. 
He illustrates the strength of this definition by evoking a judge sifting through 
statutes or edicts for a bedrock to support a judgment.8 Romano then goes on 
to point out that the legislative process is imperfect and piece-meal, and that 
inevitably, there will be statutes and regulations that contradict each other. 
He concludes that defining law as the general body of rules is flawed and ignores 
underlying principles.9 This is notably the case where there is incompatible 
divergent administrative guidance on the same type of situation, emanating from 
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid at 7.
6. Although Romano wrote the TLO decades before Derrida’s Writing and Difference, Part I of 
the TLO is a great example of a deconstructionist analysis; it is worth mentioning that at the 
time of publication of Jacques Derrida’s thesis, a French translation of Romano’s work was 
not yet available; the first French translation of the TLO was published in 1975. See Jacques 
Derrida, L’Écriture et la Différance (Seuil, 1967) at 409-29.
7. Romano, supra note 1 at 12-13.
8. Ibid at 4.
9. Ibid at 3-5. 
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different equally authoritative sources. An early Canadian constitutional law 
debate on the same issue concerned overlap between provincial and federal heads 
of power, which was eventually resolved by the doctrine of paramountcy where, 
in case of overlap of provincial and federal powers, federal legislation overrides 
even compatible provincial legislation. The principle of absurdity, which forms 
part of Canada’s modern approach to statutory interpretation, gives currency to 
Romano’s dismissal of absolutist positivism: absurdity allows a judge to ignore 
the express wording of a legislation where it counteracts the object and purpose 
of a larger legislative framework. The fact that a legislative provision may be 
intentionally ignored to uphold an unwritten “object and purpose” shows 
that our legal system now accords with Romano’s understanding insofar as it 
admits that to view the law as a body of enactments is to miss an important part 
of the picture.
Romano then turns his attention to the moralist concept that the law is a 
baseline for ethical behaviour, judging it to be “partly true and partly seriously 
mistaken.”10 For Romano, the law “not only represents an amount of morality, 
but also of economy, customs, technique.”11 It would be a fallacy to believe that 
what the law contains is a minimum baseline of anything. The fundamental 
aspect of law is determined by the institution in which it is materialized, i.e., 
“the law is the vital principal of any institution, that which animates and holds 
together the various elements that compose it.”12
Describing the law as indissociable from the “institution”—defined in 
TLO as a community that goes beyond filial bonds and has a legal element—
Romano affirms that the “concept of institution and the concept of a legal order, 
considered as a unity and as a whole, are absolutely identical.”13 The norm then, 
whether a statute, treaty,14 or judgment, becomes merely an expression of the law, 
not its essence.15 The idea that the law is the institution, and something different 
from the sum of its rules, harkens back to Socrates’ “ideal of the law,” and his 
unwillingness to frustrate a verdict against his own life, or the biblical idea that 
“the letter [of the law] killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”16 
10. Ibid at 22. 
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid at 24.
13. Ibid at 16.
14. Ibid at 28.
15. Ibid at 47.
16. 2 Corinthians 3:6.
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Having settled on “the institution,” as the simplest general definition of the 
law,17 Romano then sets out the criteria for what he considers to be an institution:
[I]n order for an institution to arise, the existence of persons connected to each 
other through simple relationships is not enough, as there must be a closer and more 
organic bond. The formation of a social super-structure is required upon which not 
only their distinct relationships, but also their own generic position depends, or that 
sway them. Therefore, it is impossible to envisage an institution only composed of 
two physical persons; for these will remain two individualities, unable to morph 
into one.18
To qualify as an institution, the community or society must have an ordering effect 
in social relations that goes beyond filial bonds or one-off interactions. Romano’s 
institution—or legal order—is the very concept of “imagined order” which Yuval 
Noah Hariri describes as the bond holding large human communities together 
and allowing them to cooperate.19 
Next, Romano presents the idea of relevance: a conflict of laws rule of sorts, 
for assessing how institutions interact.20 Romano’s relevance has many of the 
hallmarks of Derrida’s différance: just as Derrida’s différance tells the critic that 
meaning can only be deferred or understood through difference,21 for Romano, 
it is through comparison and observation of interactions between legal orders – 
their relevance to each other – that a jurist or observer can appreciate the nature 
of a legal order.22 Through relevance, one can also assess the extent to which an 
administrative, judicial, or legislative decision may impact the broader legal or 
social spectrum.
17. Romano, supra note 1 at 17-19.
18. Ibid at 32-33.
19. Yuval N Harari, Sapiens: a Brief History of Humankind (Harper, 2014) at 113. Another 
theoretical concept that resembles Romano’s legal order or institution is Althusser’s concept 
of an “ideological state apparatus,” with the distinction that a legal order includes non-state 
and even anti-state institutions. For an analysis of ISAs, see Louis Althusser, “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)” in Lenin and Philosophy and 
Other Essays (Monthly Review Press, 1971) 127 at 142-47, 166-76.
20. Romano, supra note 1 at 43.
21. Derrida, supra note 6 at 410.
22. Romano, supra note 1 at 43.
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II. PART II OF TLO: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE 
LEGAL ORDER
If Part I of TLO is a quest for a coherent general definition of the law, Part II 
shows the practical applications and uses of defining the law as the “legal order” 
or “institution.”
Having underlined the multiplicity of legal orders,23 Romano provides 
examples like international law,24 the Church,25 and organised crime26 as distinct, 
non-state legal orders, each sovereign in its own realm. This sovereignty persists 
even though subjects of a legal order may be simultaneously subject to another 
legal order with contradicting rules. For example, a state legal order may 
adopt rules pertaining to the use of Church assets or regulate behaviour of its 
members in ways that may oppose tenets of ecclesiastic principals or Canon 
Law. However, the internal hierarchy of the Church will remain intact despite 
state interference with its assets or parishioners: any change to the Church’s legal 
order must come from within.27 In fact, the historic strength of the Church’s 
legal order is the main reason why Quebec’s civil code permits a judgment for 
separation and support payments without divorce, thereby accommodating 
separating spouses who feel compelled to honour the Catholic Church’s doctrine 
of indissolubility of marriage.28
Romano provides a non-exhaustive list of different types of institutions 
for illustrative purposes and to facilitate analysis.29 First, there are original 
institutions, derivative institutions, and intermediate institutions. While a 
derivative institution may be a product of an original institution, its relationship 
to the original institution may be complementary, dependant, or antithetical. 
Second, institutions may have a particular or a general purpose. Third, the 
constitutive parts of an institution have an impact on its reach and its relevance 
to the outside world. Fourth, the level of complexity of an institution is also 
an important factor, which often has a correlation to whether the institution is 
an original, derivative, or intermediate institution. A more complex institution 
such as a state may have a number of derivative institutions such as regional 
23. Ibid at 50-51.
24. Ibid at 54.
25. Ibid at 55.
26. Ibid at 58.
27. Ibid at 57-58.
28. Arts 493-515 CCQ; AM Bilodeau, “Quelques aspects de l’influence religieuse sur le droit de 
la personne et de la famille au Québec” (1984) 15 RGD 573 at 586.
29. Romano, supra note 1 at 67-68.
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governments, municipalities, ministries, et cetera. Fifth, an institution can be 
considered as “perfect” or “imperfect,” meaning it can be autonomous and 
self-sustaining, or owe its existence to another perfect institution. The dependence 
of an institution on another may be positive or negative. Lastly, a legal order may 
or may not have legal personality. Having legal personality elevates the status 
of an institution and allows it to assert itself. The significance of legal status 
is captured well in the HBO series, The Wire, for example, where Omar Little 
rightfully draws parallels between a criminal defence lawyer who “robs drug 
dealers” by charging exorbitant fees to defend them in court and his own criminal 
operation of robbing them at gun point.30 Omar’s profession is illegal, however, 
while a criminal defence lawyer is part of a professional order with legal status.
In addition to the broad categories above, Romano provides five heads 
of “relevance”: subordination, presupposition, mutual independence and 
simultaneous reliance on a third legal order, and succession.31 Subordination 
occurs where a legal order may be subordinated to another. An example of 
this is the idea of paramountcy in Canadian constitutional law, requiring that 
where a provincial and federal head of power legitimately occupying the same 
space are in conflict, the federal law should be given precedence. Romano also 
gives the example of “soft” subordination, exemplified by international law 
“hovering” over the state legal order. Presupposition occurs where a legal order 
takes the existence of another for granted. Presupposition does not necessarily 
imply superiority or subordination: municipal law presupposes a broader 
administrative legal order; a confederation presupposes constitutive states; and 
supranational international institutions presuppose the existence of national legal 
orders. The third head of relevance is mutual independence and simultaneous 
reliance on a third legal order. Romano cites the relationship of independent 
states, within a broader international legal order, as an illustration of this. The 
state legal orders function independently, but there is a broader international 
legal order that enables that peaceful co-existence. Next, spontaneous voluntary 
subordination includes the ideas of judicial comity or forum non conveniens in 
private international law as examples of where a legal order voluntarily submits 
part of itself to another. Finally, succession arises where a legal order is subsumed 
in another, but transforms it in the process.
30. Paul Owen, “The Wire re-up: season two, episode six – Levy and Omar: who is the real 
criminal?” (30 June 2009) online (video): <www.theguardian.com/media/organgrinder/2009/
jun/23/wire-television>.
31. Romano, supra note 1 at 70-71.
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Romano applies his analytical framework to concrete examples in order to 
better understand the dynamics of public international law;32 the relationship 
between the Church and state;33 and the intricate balance of factory production 
and labour unions.34 One notable conclusion made by Romano is that non-state 
legal orders may be more powerful and result in an individual having deference 
to the whims of another person or entity, even though that individual may have 
superior rights in law—superior rights that they choose not to invoke because of 
powerful “social” forces.35 An example cited by Romano is a father who chooses 
to pay a dowry for his daughter, even though it is illegal under Italian law.36
III. REVIEWER’S COMMENTS: PUTTING CROCE’S 
TRANSLATION IN CONTEXT
The influence of Romano’s work permeates scholarship looking at institutional 
evolution37 and reforms of complex systems involving multiple stakeholders, 
institutions, and states.38
Despite the absence of an English translation, English-speaking legal scholars 
have often made reference to Romano’s ideas, with some notable examples 
catalogued in Filippo Fontanelli’s Santi Romano and L’ordinamento giurdico: The 
Relevance of a Forgotten Masterpiece for Contemporary International, Translational 
and Global Legal Relations.39 However, the notable absence of any reference 
to Romano’s work in recent anthologies of legal theory or legal philosophy 
32. Ibid at 73-80.
33. Ibid at 80, 86, 90.
34. Ibid at 96-100.
35. Ibid at 98.
36. Ibid at 94. 
37. Maria Adele Carrai, “It is not the end of History: The Financing Institutions of the Belt 
and Road Initiative and the Bretton Woods System” (2017) online: Transnational Dispute 
Management <www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2471>.
38. Allison Christians & Stephen Shay, “General Report” in 102A Cahiers de Droit Fiscal 
International: Assessing BEPS: Origins, Standards, and Responses 17 (International Fiscal 
Association, 2017), online (pdf ): <dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33139067/102A-
GenReport.pdf>; Kim Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important 
but Underappreciated International Tax Value” in Richard Krever & John G. Head, eds, Tax 
Reform in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International, 2008). 
39. Filipo Fontanelli, “Santi Romano and L’ordinamento giurdico: The Relevance of a Forgotten 
Masterpiece for Contemporary International, Translational and Global Legal Relations” 
(2011) 2 TLT 67 at 70, n13.
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demonstrates the necessity of Croce’s endeavor.40 Croce’s translation joins the 
ranks of prior efforts which rendered Romano’s work accessible in French, 
German, Portuguese, and Spanish, and at last allows English-speakers to directly 
engage with it as a primary source.
Given conceptual dissonance between English common law and continental 
civil law, a review by a common law jurist familiar with civil law concepts and 
terminology may help improve future editions of the translation. Consistently 
using  standard common law terminology for concepts such as “bodies corporate”, 
“conflict of laws rules”, “royal prerogative”, and “non-pecuniary obligations”, 
where TLO presently uses phrases like “moral entities”41 “norm of collision”,42 
“special power of supremacy”,43 and “obligations that do not have a patrimonial 
character”44 would add clarity to the text. Additional footnotes may also be 
helpful to update certain areas that have seen changes since Romano’s publication 
of 1945.45 For those well-versed versed in the French language and familiar with 
civil law concepts, the abridged translation and commentary by Jacques Bergé 
may prove a good compliment to Croce’s translation.46
40. Although Romano’s work lends itself to the subject matter, it is not mentioned in either of 
these recent legal survey publications: Oren Perez and Gunther Teubner eds, Paradoxes and 
Inconsistencies in the Law (Hart Publishing, 2006); Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal 
Theory 2nd Ed, (New York, 2004).
41. Romano, supra note 1 at 14.
42. Ibid at 85.
43. Ibid at 108.
44. Ibid at 105.
45. The following passage is faithfully translated in the publication: “international law does not 
have the power to deny the validity of the distinct ramifications of the state order, which 
is located in a different sphere, impermeable to international law.” TLO, supra note 1 at 
70, §36. While this statement is true in certain jurisdictions, most jurisdictions, specifically 
monist jurisdictions such as Italy, have moved towards a model of direct application of 
international law and a system of hierarchy of rules, an example of which is Arret Niccolo in 
France. See CE, 20 October 1989, Raoul Georges Nicolo contre commissaire du gouverment 
[1989] Rec 108243.
46. Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, Les ordres juridiques (Dalloz, 2015).
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IV. OVERCOMING THE ROMANO DILEMMA: THE CANADIAN 
MISSING LINK
A frequent critique of Romano’s theory is its failure or reluctance to legitimise 
the state legal order and to define how norms come about and what distinguishes 
mandatory and optional norms.47 The absence of arguments posited to legitimise 
the state legal order is known as the Romano dilemma.48 For Croce, there is no 
theoretical resolution to the absence of attribution of legitimacy in Romano’s 
theory. Croce sees Romano’s theory as a conceptual framework which allows jurists 
to view and understand social phenomena through a legal lens. For Fontanelli, 
legitimising the state or any legal order is irrelevant in the context of Romano’s 
theory, as Romano views the creation of the legal order as a non-juridical process.49
In his Introduction to TLO, Martin Loughin posits that Romano was himself 
cognizant of the fact that his theoretical framework does not address whether his 
work is “a thesis on the plurality of legal orders in society or on the modern form 
of law as a concrete-order,” saying that in a 1909 speech, “[Romano] recognized 
that the challenge for the idea of the state as the ‘institution of institutions’ is that 
of somehow being able to transcend these [non-state legal order] interests and 
realize the common good.”50 Remarkably, the late Professor Patrick Glenn, when 
concluding his odyssey surveying legal systems such as the civil law, common law, 
Talmudic Law, Sharia, and other legal orders or traditions, concludes his grand 
contribution to legal pluralist scholarship by saying that many or all of these legal 
orders may co-exist in major cosmopolitan areas, and that despite “application 
47. In this portion of the publication, Croce critically engages with Romano’s work. See Mariano 
Croce, “Afterword: The juristic point of view: an interpretive account of the Legal Order” in 
Santi Romano, The Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) 111 at 127.
48. Ibid at 128.
49. See Fontanelli, supra note 39 at 76. Fontanelli states:
Similarly, any investigation into the voluntarist commencement or foundation of the order 
would be, according to Romano, a non-juridical attempt. As it follows, Romano’s legal order 
is a static snapshot of the organisation, in which human voluntary action plays little role either 
in supporting or changing the system; the latter, in turn, evolves spontaneously. Human action 
and the norms regulating it are disregarded by Romano, whose equivalence between (static) 
order and law echoes Hegel’s equivalence between reality and rationality.
50. Martin Loughlin, “Santi Romano and the institutional theory of law” in Santi Romano, The 
Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) xi at xxii [emphasis added].
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of non-state legal traditions to many questions of personal status, family law and 
succession—the state, somehow, persists.”51 
While this is not highlighted by Croce, Loughin, Fontanelli, or Bergé’s 
commentaries, the late Professor Roderick A. Macdonald, who studied at 
Osgoode Hall Law School and the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law 
before going on to teach at the faculties of Law at both Windsor and McGill 
universities, resolves this analytical conundrum by going back to the individual 
and developing the notions of subjective-subjectivity and inter-normativity to 
define the norm-generative process: it is the individual who initiates, perpetuates, 
or weakens a legal order by his or her individual actions.52 The tapestry of the 
legal orders supporting the many interactions and relationships within a society 
is weaved by individual actions and decisions.
Macdonald’s critical legal pluralism compliments Romano’s legal order. 
Whereas Romano allows us to grasp a detailed snapshot of the various legal 
orders affecting or influencing a specific action or transaction, Macdonald 
legitimises those legal orders and demystifies the norm generative process 
through subjective-subjectivity (the idea that a subject of a legal order opts to 
subject herself to a rule or legal order; hence subjection to a rule or legal order is 
a subjective choice made at the individual level) and internormativity (the idea 
that an individual will be confronted with competing demands from different 
norms emanating from separate legal orders to which they are simultaneously 
subject;53 internormativity can also be seen as the micro-equivalent to relevance 
in Romano’s macro framework). Macdonald’s article exposing informal 
associations between former and current camp managers, whom he refers to 
51. Patrick H Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 365 
[emphasis added].
52. Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick A Macdonald, “What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism” 
(1997) 12 CJLS 25.
53. Roderick A Macdonald, “Custom Made-For a Non-chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism” 
(2011) 26 CJLS 301 at 324:
Our normative commitments thus vary depending on our various configurations of self, which 
is shaped and informed by our personal motivations, bonds to others, institutional affiliations, 
and identity markers. Each of these aspects of our selves, the plurality of identities we “live by,” is 
variably ascribed by ourselves and also prescribed by others to varying degrees. Individuals may 
feel bound to a web of multiple, sometimes conflicting legal regimes, whether by virtue of their 
affiliations with various social groups, by their own individual normative standards, through 
their interaction with institutions (families, clubs, churches, schools, self-regulating bodies, 
corporations, communities, etc.) that reflect, reinforce, and implement these standards. Law 
emerges, then, through these interactions and relationships and not through coercive means.
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as the Vielle Garde,54 is a good example of how going back to the individual 
provides a concrete demonstration of how a legal order is legitimised and evolves 
through subjective-subjectivity. The state persists because of the complex web of 
relationships of individuals across legal orders who subjectively subject themselves 
to the state legal order when bargaining their allegiances to different legal orders: 
A critical legal pluralism presumes that legal subjects hold each of their multiple 
narrating selves up to the scrutiny of each of their other narrating selves, and up to 
the scrutiny of all the other narrated selves projected upon them by others. The self 
is the irreducible site of normativity and internormativity. And the very idea of law 
must be autobiographical.55
Macdonald’s work in improving the administrative process,56 harmonizing the 
law of secured transactions,57 and developing new ways of teaching the law58 
is a testament to the enabling effect of pragmatically and objectively applying 
Romano’s framework to understand “the law,” while remembering the potential 
of the individual who lies within, at the centre of the interlocking web of legal 
orders vying for their allegiance.
V. ENDURING RELEVANCE
Romano’s definition of the law allows actors involved at different levels, be it rule 
setters, adjudicators, subjects, or would-be disrupters, to understand the rules of 
the game or system. It enables actors to identify the legal orders at play and to 
judge the relevance of such legal orders, facilitating a decision. 
54. Roderick A Macdonald, “Les Vieilles Gardes. Hypothèses sur l’émergence des normes, 
l’internormativité et le désordre à travers une typologie des institutions normatives” in JG 
Belley, ed, Le droit soluble: Contributions québécoises à l’étude de l’internormativité (Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1996) at 233-72.
55. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 52 at 46. 
56. Macdonald was involved with public inquiries such as the Canadian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Quebec Charbonneau Commission. Macdonald’s 
contributions in different areas are also catalogued in: Andrée Lajoie, “La vie intellectuelle de 
Roderick Macdonald: un engagement” (Les Éditions Thémis, 2014); The Unbounded Level of 
the Mind: Rod Macdonald’s Legal Imagination (McGill University, 7 February 2014) online: 
<www.mcgill.ca/macdonald-symposium> 
57. MacDonald worked on the Québec civil law of hypothecation, UCC Article 9, and UN 
efforts at a model law of personal property.
58. This includes the very creation of a successful “transsystemic” and “bilingual” program 
of legal education at McGill University. See also Roderick A Macdonald, “Curricular 
Development in the 1980s: A Perspective” (1982) 32 J Legal Educ 569, cited in Natasha 
Bakht & et al, “Counting Outsiders: a Critical Exploration of Outsider Course Enrollment 
in Canadian Legal Education” 45 OHLJ 667 at 669, n2.
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From a legal perspective, Romano’s analytical framework is very suitable 
for helping a lawyer decide the remedy to seek for a client when presented 
with more than one option, including remedies in common law or equity. The 
analytical framework would prove useful to the Chief Compliance Officer of an 
international bank grappling with implementation of novel regulations such as 
GDPR, inviting them to reflect on  their business lines, geographical areas, and 
clientele. Awareness of the multiplicity of legal orders and types of relevance is 
also helpful to businesses raising capital, in that it opens facets such as client 
perception, economic outlook, and scrutiny from regulators when grappling 
with the choice of a public or private offering, traditional debt or equity, or more 
novel means such as a coin offering or crowd funding. It also provides a frame of 
reference for moderators of a U.S.-based social networking platform, for instance, 
when faced with competing legally sound arguments of allowing all speech based 
on the U.S. Constitution’s unfettered understanding of what constitutes free 
speech on the one hand, and their duty of care as a privately owned platform to 
third parties or individuals that are targeted by their users. 
Romano’s definition of the law and his framework for assessing relationships 
between legal orders also enhances the reader’s ability to rise to new challenges 
outside of the judicial context. With new realities such as the rise of artificial 
intelligence and the gig economy, TLO would help regulators, actors, and 
entrepreneurs to distinguish between open and closed systems as well as provide 
tools to predict interactions between multiple open or closed systems.59 The great 
strength of Romano’s thesis is the fact that it does not willfully ignore the presence 
of non-official or “immoral” institutions, nor does it dismiss them as irrelevant. 
His aim is not to automatically legitimize a state or a “natural” or “divine” legal 
order.60 Rather Romano provides tools to identify systems and their (unspoken) 
rules—or essence—as well as an analytical framework to assess how they interact.
Thanks to Croce’s endeavor, Romano’s foundational contribution to pluralist 
and institutionalist legal thought is now available to an English-speaking audience, 
59. Speaking on the topic of artificial intelligence and human job redundancy, Garry Kasparov 
underlined the importance of distinguishing between open and closed systems, and 
how artificial intelligence excels in the latter but struggles with the former. See “The 
Future of Everything Festival: Garry Kasparov on AI Making Us Free” (10 May 2018) 
at 00:05m, online (podcast): WSJ’s The Future of Everything <www.wsj.com/podcasts/
wsj-the-future-of-everything/the-future-of-everything-festival-garry-kasparov-on-ai-making-
us-free/4190b7f2-97b4-4e81-ae70-b803a0d37ed6>.
60. Romano, supra note 1 at 96.
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putting an end to what Jan Paulsson called a “scandal of intellectual history.”61 
TLO is indispensable for law students, legal scholars, judges, and lawyers who 
seek a general meaning of the law that goes beyond legal disciplines. It is also 
of great value to anyone looking for an analytical framework that would help 
identify the laws or rules at play in specific contexts as well as the ways in which 
they relate to each other.
61. Jan Paulsson, “Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals” (Lalive Lecture 
delivered at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Geneva, 27 May 
2009), (2008) 23 Foreign Investment LJ 215 at 217.

